This study develops an R&D-based growth model that features both vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or sti ‡es innovation. Speci…cally, we analyze the growth and welfare e¤ects of patent protection in the form of pro…t division between sequential innovators along the quality ladder. We show that patent protection has asymmetric e¤ects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion). Maximizing the incentives for vertical (horizontal) innovation requires a pro…t-division rule that assigns the entire ‡ow pro…t to the entrant (incumbent) of a quality ladder. In light of this …nding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare implications of patent protection, it is important to disentangle its di¤erent e¤ects on vertical and horizontal innovation.
Introduction
Since the early 1980's, the patent system in the US has undergone substantial changes. 1 As a result of this patent reform, the strength of patent protection in the US has increased. For example, Park (2008) provides an index of patent rights on a scale of 0 to 5 (a larger number implies stronger protection) and shows that the strength of patent rights in the US increases from 3.8 in 1975 to 4.9 in 2005. 2 In other words, patentholders can now better protect their inventions against imitation as well as subsequent innovation. In an environment with sequential innovation, these overlapping patent rights across sequential innovators lead to contrasting e¤ects on the incentives for R&D. On one hand, the traditional view suggests that stronger patent rights improve the protection for existing inventions and hence increase its value to the patentholders. On the other hand, the recent argument against patent protection suggests that stronger patent rights sti ‡e innovation by conferring too much power onto existing patentholders, who use this power to extract surplus from subsequent innovators rather than providing more innovation. 3 In this study, we develop a simple growth model to shed some light on this current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or sti ‡es innovation. 4 We argue that the two seemingly contradictory views of patent protection are in fact two sides of the same coin. In other words, strengthening existing patentholders' protection against future innovations inevitably decreases subsequent innovators' incentives for R&D and leads to contrasting e¤ects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement within an industry) 5 and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion that gives rise to new industries). 1 See Gallini (2002) , Ja¤e (2000) and Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) for a detailed discussion on these changes in patent policy. 2 The index in Park (2008) is an updated version of the index in Ginarte and Park (1997) , who examine …ve categories of patent rights and assign a score from zero to one to each category. These …ve categories are patent duration, coverage, enforcement mechanisms, restrictions on patent scope, and membership in international treaties. 3 See, for example, Bessen and Meurer (2008) , Bodrin and Levine (2008) and Ja¤e and Lerner (2004) . 4 O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004), Furukawa (2007) , Horii and Iwaisako (2007) , Acs and Sanders (2009) and Cozzi and Galli (2009) also analyze the contrasting e¤ects of patent protection on innovation in R&D-based growth models. Later on, we will discuss how the present study relates to and di¤ers from these interesting studies.
In light of this …nding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare implications of patent protection, it is important to disentangle its di¤erent e¤ects on vertical and horizontal innovation. In fact, there is an on-going debate among policy analysts as to whether patent protection promotes horizontal innovation at the expense of vertical innovation. 6 To analyze the asymmetric e¤ects of patent protection on vertical and horizontal innovation, this study develops an R&D-based growth model that features both quality improvement and variety expansion. Within this framework, we derive the growth and welfare e¤ects of patent protection in the form of pro…t division between sequential innovators within the same industry. We …nd that there is a tension between maximizing the incentives for vertical innovation and that of horizontal innovation. On one hand, maximizing the incentives for vertical innovation requires a pro…t-division rule that allows the entrant to keep all the pro…t. On the other hand, maximizing the incentives for horizontal innovation requires a pro…t-division rule that assigns as much pro…t to the incumbent (i.e., the previous innovator) as possible. Given that economic growth is driven by both quality improvement and variety expansion, there is a growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule. Furthermore, the pro…t-division rule has an additional level e¤ect on welfare, so that there also exists a welfare-maximizing pro…t-division rule that is generally di¤erent from the growth-maximizing rule. Calibrating the model and simulating the transition dynamics, we …nd that an increase in the share of pro…t assigned to the incumbent would sti ‡e vertical innovation and decrease the overall growth rate despite an increase in horizontal innovation. This …nding is consistent with the recent concerns on the innovation-sti ‡ing e¤ects of stronger patent rights. However, we also …nd that social welfare may increase despite the lower growth rate suggesting that a proper welfare analysis should investigate beyond the e¤ects of patent protection on innovation and growth. Nordhaus (1969) is the seminal study on the optimal design of patent protection, and he shows that the optimal patent length should balance between the social bene…t of innovation and the social cost of monopolistic distortion. Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review on the subsequent development in the patent-design literature. In this literature, an interesting and important policy lever is forward patent protection (i.e., leading patent breadth) that gives rise to the division of pro…t between sequential innovators. 7 A recent study by Segal and Whinston (2007) analyzes a general antitrust policy lever that has a similar e¤ect as the division of pro…t between the entrant and the incumbent. They show that in an in…nite-horizon model with leapfrogging, protecting the entrant at the expense of the incumbent has a frontloading e¤ect that potentially increases innovation. However, they also note that their result does not apply to the …rst …rm of a quality ladder. The present study complements their analysis by (i) taking into account the e¤ect of pro…t division on variety inventors (i.e., the …rst …rm of each variety) and (ii) performing the analysis in a growth-theoretic framework that allows for an explicit consideration of economic growth and social welfare.
O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) merge the patent-design literature and the R&D-based growth literature by incorporating leading breadth into a quality-ladder growth model with overlapping patent rights across sequential innovators. In their model, for a given rate of innovation, increasing the share of pro…t assigned to the current innovator (i.e., the entrant of a quality ladder) while holding leading breadth constant would increase the incentives for innovation. Intuitively, along the quality ladder, every innovator is …rstly an entrant and then becomes an incumbent whose patent is infringed upon. Therefore, setting aside the issues of pro…t growth and discounting, every innovator receives the same amount of pro…t over the lifetime of an invention. Given that the real interest rate is higher than the growth rate in their model, delaying the receipt of pro…ts reduces the present value of the income stream. As a result, the complete frontloading pro…t-division rule (i.e., allowing the entrant to keep all the pro…t) tends to maximize the market value of an invention and hence the incentives for R&D. 8 However, in a model with both vertical and horizontal innovation, this result may no longer hold. In this case, the inventor of a new variety is the …rst innovator on a quality ladder; therefore, assigning a larger share of pro…t to the incumbent would tend to increase horizontal innovation. Given that quality improvement and variety expansion are both important channels for economic growth, the growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule should balance between the asymmetric e¤ects of pro…t division on vertical and horizontal innovation. Furthermore, given that growth maximization does not necessarily give rise to welfare maximization, we characterize both the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing pro…t-division rules.
This study also relates to other growth-theoretic studies on patent policy. Judd (1985) provides the seminal dynamic analysis on patent length, and he …nds that an in…nite patent length maximizes innovation and welfare. Subsequent studies …nd that strengthening patent protection in various forms does not necessarily increase innovation and may even sti ‡e it. Examples of these studies include Horowitz and Lai (1996) 9 The present study di¤ers from these studies by (i) analyzing a di¤erent patent-policy lever (i.e., the pro…t-division rule between sequential innovators) and (ii) emphasizing the asymmetric e¤ects of patent protection on vertical and horizontal innovation. 10 In other words, rather than analyzing the e¤ects of patent policy on the level of innovation as is common in the literature, we consider a much less explored question that is the e¤ects of patent policy on the allocation of R&D inputs.
Cozzi (2001) analyzes patent protection in the form of intellectual appropriability (i.e., the ability of an innovator to patent her invention in the presence of spying activities) in a quality-ladder model. Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) extend this analysis into a model with both vertical and horizontal innovation. In their model, spying activities are targeted only at quality improvement. Therefore, strengthening intellectual appropriability stimulates vertical innovation (at the expense of horizontal innovation) and increases long-run growth because horizontal innovation only has a level e¤ect in their model for removing scale e¤ects. In contrast, long-run growth depends on both vertical and horizontal innovation in the present study, 11 and hence, the asymmetric e¤ects of pro…t division on vertical and horizontal innovation give 9 Also, a recent study by Kiedaisch (2009) shows that in a product-variety model with hierarchical preferences, the innovation-maximizing level of patent protection may depend on the income distribution. 10 O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) also consider a model with both vertical and horizontal innovation in their appendix. However, their focus is on the e¤ects of patentability requirement and leading breadth, and they did not analyze the e¤ects of alternative pro…t-division rules in the presence of vertical and horizontal innovation. 11 See footnotes (12) and (25) for a discussion on the issue of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models.
rise to a growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule.
Acs and Sanders (2009) and Cozzi and Galli (2009) also analyze the division of pro…t between innovators. Acs and Sanders (2009) analyze the separation between invention and commercialization in a variety-expanding model while Cozzi and Galli (2009) consider basic research and applied research in a quality-ladder model. In these studies, each invention (i.e., a new variety or a quality improvement) is created in a two-step innovation process; therefore, there exists a growth-maximizing division of pro…t that balances between the incentives of the …rst and second innovators of each invention. The present study di¤ers from these studies by analyzing the division of pro…t between sequential innovators within the same industry (in which every innovator is …rstly an entrant and then becomes an incumbent). Also, we consider a model that features both vertical and horizontal innovation. We …nd that frontloading (backloading) the income stream along the quality ladder stimulates vertical (horizontal) innovation, and it is the interaction of these two types of innovation that gives rise to a growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule in this study.
This study also relates to Acemoglu (2009) , who shows that under the current patent system, the equilibrium diversity of innovation is insu¢cient. In other words, innovators have too much incentive to invest in R&D on improving existing products but too little incentive to invest in R&D on developing new products that may become useful in the future. Acemoglu suggests that increasing the diversity of researchers could be a partial remedy against this problem of insu¢cient diversity. The present study suggests another possible solution that is to increase the share of pro…t assigned to the pioneering inventor of a product. In this case, there will be a reallocation of research inputs from vertical innovation (i.e., R&D on existing products) to horizontal innovation (i.e., R&D on new products).
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 de…nes the equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium allocation. Section 4 considers the growth and welfare e¤ects of the pro…t-division rule. Section 5 calibrates the model and simulates the transition dynamics to provide a quantitative analysis. The …nal section concludes.
A simple model of horizontal and vertical innovation
To consider both vertical and horizontal innovation in an R&D-based growth model, 12 we modify the Grossman-Helpman (1991) quality-ladder model by endogenizing the number of varieties in the economy. 13 Furthermore, to consider the division of pro…t between sequential innovators along the quality ladder, we assume that each entrant (i.e., the most recent innovator) infringes the patent of the incumbent (i.e., the previous innovator). As a result of this patent infringement, the entrant has to transfer a share s 2 [0; 1] of her pro…t to the incumbent. However, with vertical innovation, every innovator's patent would eventually be infringed by the next innovation, and she can then extract a share s of pro…t from the next entrant. This formulation of pro…t division between sequential innovators originates from O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) . As for horizontal innovation, the invention of a new variety does not infringe any patent, so that a variety inventor does not have to share her pro…t but maintains the rights to extract pro…t from the next entrant. Given that the Grossman-Helpman model is well-studied, we will describe the familiar features brie ‡y to conserve space and discuss new features (i.e., variety expansion and the division of pro…t) in details.
Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households. Their lifetime utility is given by
where > 0 is discount rate, and c t is the consumption index at time t. The consumption index is de…ned as
(2) shows that the households derive utility by consuming a continuum of products y t (i). In Grossman and Helpman (1991), there is a unit continuum of these products. In the present study, we endogenize the number of varieties by allowing for horizontal innovation. n t is the number of active varieties that are consumed by households at time t, and its law of motion is given by
n t is the total number of varieties that have been invented in the past, and : n t is the number of newly invented varieties at time t. We follow Grossman and Lai (2004) to allow for the possibility that an invented variety becomes obsolete at some point. For tractability, we assume that each active variety i 2 [0; n t ] at time t faces the same probability > 0 to become permanently obsolete. 15 Households maximize (1) subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
a t is the value of assets owned by households, and r t is the rate of return. Households inelastically supply one unit of high-skill labor for R&D and L > 1 units of low-skill labor for production. 16 The wage rates for highskill and low-skill labors are w h;t and w l;t respectively. p t (i) is the price of product i at time t. If we denote t as the Hamiltonian co-state variable, then households' intratemporal optimality condition is
for i 2 [0; n t ], and the intertemporal optimality condition is
Production
There is a continuum of active varieties i 2 [0; n t ] that are consumed by households at time t. The production function for the most recent innovator in industry i is
The parameter z > 1 is the step size of each productivity improvement, and q t (i) is the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry i as of time t. l t (i) is the number of low-skill production workers employed in industry i. Given z qt(i) , the marginal cost of production for the most recent innovator in industry i is
Notice that we here adopt a "cost reducing" view of vertical innovation following Peretto (1998 Peretto ( , 1999 and Peretto and Smulders (2002) . 17 In each high-skill labor, we naturally distinguish between high-skill labor for R&D and low-skill labor for production. However, it is useful to note that our main result (i.e., an increase in s increases horizontal innovation but decreases vertical innovation) carries over to a setting with homogenous labor that is allocated across production, vertical R&D and horizontal R&D. 17 It is useful to note that cost reduction is isomorphic to quality improvement in these studies as well as in the current framework. To see this, the reader could easily reinterpret y t (i) as the consumption of the latest version, q t (i), of product i, along the lines of Grossman and Helpman (1991) , that is by assuming ln c t 0 B @
consumption good {'s production function given by y t (i) = l t (i). Clearly, the pro…t function (10) would follow directly from Bertrand competition, instead of the no longer valid (8) and (9) .
industry that has at least two generations of innovation, the most recent innovator infringes the previous innovator's patent. As a result of this patent infringement, the most recent innovator pays a licensing fee by transferring a share s of her pro…t to the previous innovator. We follow O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) to consider an exogenous pro…t-division rule. 18 This pro…t-division rule can be interpreted as the outcome of a bargaining game, in which the bargaining power of each side is in ‡uenced by patent policy. Therefore, it is not an unrealistic assumption to treat s as a policy parameter.
O'Donoghue and Zweimuller (2004) are interested in the e¤ects of leading breadth on R&D and economic growth through the consolidation of market power that enables the most recent innovator and the previous innovator to consolidate their market power and charge a higher markup. We do not adopt this formulation here for three reasons. Firstly, the collusion between innovators may be prohibited by antitrust laws. Secondly, the licensing agreement only allows the most recent innovator to produce, but it may not prevent the previous innovator from selling her products at a lower price. As a result, the previous innovator may have the incentives to continue selling her products and undercut the markup. Thirdly, we want to focus on the pro…t-division e¤ect (instead of the markup e¤ect) of patent protection in this study. Given these considerations, we assume that the most recent innovator and the previous innovator engage in the usual Bertrand competition as in Grossman and Helpman (1991) . The pro…t-maximizing price for the most recent innovator is a constant markup (given by the step size z) over her own marginal cost in (8).
Given (7) - (9), the amount of monopolistic pro…t generated by the most recent innovation is
where the second equality is obtained by using (5), (7) and (9) . Due to pro…t division, the most recent innovator obtains (1 s) t while the previous innovator obtains s t . The above discussion implicitly assumes that the most recent innovation and the second-most recent innovation are owned by di¤erent …rms (i.e., the Arrow replacement e¤ect). In Lemma 1, we show that the Arrow replacement e¤ect is indeed present in this quality-ladder model with pro…t division.
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Lemma 1 The Arrow replacement e¤ect is present.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
Finally, for a newly invented variety, we make the usual simplifying assumption that the productivity of labor in each new variety 21 is randomly drawn from the existing distribution of active products i 2 [0; n t ]. We also assume that a variety inventor can only patent the most advanced technology. Given that the lower-productivity production methods are unpatented, Bertrand competition drives the markup down to z as well. 22 However, because there is no previous patentholder in the newly created industry, the variety inventor obtains the entire until the next productivity improvement occurs, and then she can extract s from the entrant. 20 Cozzi (2007) shows that the Arrow e¤ect is not necessarily inconsistent with the empirical observation that incumbents often target innovation at their own industries. Under this interpretation, the incumbents' choice of R&D is simply indeterminate, so that the aggregate economy behaves as if innovation is targeted only by entrants. See also Etro (2004 Etro ( , 2008 for an interesting analysis on innovation by incumbents with a …rst-mover advantage. 21 Or the quality of each new variety, in the equivalent quality ladder interpretation explained above. 22 In the alternative case of drastic innovation, a new variety inventor and the most recent innovator for an existing variety would also choose the same equilibrium markup that is determined by the elasticity of substitution.
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Vertical innovation
Denote v 2;t (i) as the value of the patent held by the second-most recent innovator in industry i. Because t (i) = t for i 2 [0; n t ] from (10), v 2;t (i) = v 2;t in a symmetric equilibrium (i.e., an equal arrival rate of innovation across industries). 23 In this case, the familiar no-arbitrage condition for v 2;t is
The left-hand side of (11) is the return on this asset. The right-hand side of (11) is the sum of (i) the pro…t s t received by the patentholder, (ii) the potential capital gain : v 2;t , and (iii) the expected capital loss due to obsolescence v 2;t and creative destruction t v 2;t , where t is the Poisson arrival rate of innovation in the industry. As for the value of the patent held by the most recent innovator, the no-arbitrage condition for v 1;t is
The intuition behind (12) is the same as (11) except for the addition of the last term. When the next quality improvement occurs, the most recent innovator becomes the second-most recent innovator and hence her net expected capital loss is t (v 1;t v 2;t ).
There is a unit continuum of vertical-R&D …rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1] doing research on vertical innovation in each industry i. They hire high-skill labor h q;t (j) to create productivity improvements, and the expected pro…t of …rm j is q;t (j) = v 1;t t (j) w h;t h q;t (j).
The …rm-level arrival rate of innovation is
where ' q;t is the productivity of vertical R&D at time t. The zero-expectedpro…t condition for vertical R&D is
We follow Jones and Williams (2000) to assume that ' q;t = ' q (h q;t ) q 1 , where ' q > 0 is a productivity parameter for vertical R&D and q 2 (0; 1) captures the usual negative externality in intratemporal duplication within each industry. In equilibrium, the industry-level arrival rate of innovation equals the aggregate of …rm-level arrival rates. Therefore, the arrival rate of vertical innovation for each variety is t = ' q (h q;t ) q .
Horizontal innovation
Denote v n;t as the value of inventing a new variety. The no-arbitrage condition for v n;t is r t v n;t = t + : v n;t ( + t )v n;t + t v 2;t .
The only di¤erence between (12) and (16) is that a variety inventor captures t while a quality innovator captures (1 s) t . There is also a unit continuum of horizontal-R&D …rms indexed by k 2 [0; 1] doing research on creating new varieties. They hire high-skill labor h n;t (k) to create inventions, and the pro…t of …rm k is n;t (k) = v n;t : n t (k) w h;t h n;t (k).
The number of inventions created by …rm k is : n t (k) = ' n;t h n;t (k),
where ' n;t is the productivity of horizontal R&D at time t. The zero-pro…t condition for horizontal R&D is v n;t ' n;t = w h;t .
Again, ' n;t = ' n (h n;t ) n 1 , where ' n > 0 is a productivity parameter for variety-expanding R&D and n 2 (0; 1) captures the duplication externality in horizontal innovation. The total number of inventions created at time t is : n t = ' n (h n;t ) n .
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Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path fy t (i); l t ; h q;t ; h n;t ; r t ; p t (i); w l;t ; w h;t ; v n;t ; v 1;t ; v 2;t g, t 0. Also, at each instant of time, households maximize utility taking fr t ; p t (i); w l;t ; w h;t g as given;
production …rms produce fy t (i)g and choose fp t (i)g to maximize pro…t taking fw l;t g as given;
vertical-innovation …rms choose fh q;t g to maximize expected pro…t taking fw h;t ; v 1;t g as given;
horizontal-innovation …rms choose fh n;t g to maximize pro…t taking fw h;t ; v n;t g as given;
the low-skill labor market clears such that n t l t = L; and the high-skill labor market clears such that h n;t + n t h q;t = 1.
Stationary equilibrium
We focus on a stationary equilibrium, in which the number of active varieties is constant. Substituting (20) into (3) yields : n t = ' n (h n;t ) n n t . Therefore,
The number of production workers per variety is
Let us choose low-skill labor as the numeraire (i.e., w l;t = 1 for all t). Then, combining (5), (7) and (9) shows that is constant in the stationary equilibrium implying that r = from (6) and : t = t = 0 from (10). Applying the stationary equilibrium conditions on (11), (12) and (16) yields
(24) shows that the value of a new variety v n is increasing in s for a given innovation rate because a larger s allows the variety inventor to extract more pro…t from the next innovator. In contrast, (23) shows that the value of a productivity improvement v 1 is decreasing in s for a given because of the backloading e¤ect =( + + ) < 1. In other words, delaying the income stream reduces its expected present value due to discounting and the possibility of obsolescence .
24
Substituting (23) and (24) into v 1 ' q = v n ' n from (15) and (19) yields
We will refer to (25) as the arbitrage condition. To close the model, we manipulate h n;t + n t h q;t = 1 to derive
We will refer to (26) as the resource constraint. The equilibrium allocation of high-skill labor is implicitly determined by solving (25) and (26) . Taking the total di¤erentials of (26) yields
In other words, the resource constraint describes a negative relationship between h n and h q . As for the arbitrage condition in (25) , h q has opposing e¤ects on the arbitrage condition. On one hand, an increase in h q decreases ' q . For a given value of v n =v 1 , h n must rise and ' n must fall to balance
On the other hand, a larger h q increases and decreases 24 At the …rst glance, the asymmetric e¤ect of s on v n and v 1 appears to crucially depend on the assumption that a new variety does not infringe any patent. However, this is not true. Suppose a new variety infringes with a probabiliy . Then, it is easy to see that so long as < =( + + ), v n is still increasing in s for a given . Therefore, the key assumption here is that horizontal innovation carries a much smaller chance of patent infringement than vertical innovation.
v n =v 1 when s > 0. If this latter e¤ect is strong enough, it may lead to a decrease in h n . Taking the total di¤erentials of (25) yields
(28) (28) shows that dh n =dh q must be positive when h q equals zero or becomes su¢ciently large. However, at intermediate values of h q , it is possible for dh n =dh q to be negative. In this case, there may be multiple equilibria. To rule out multiple equilibrium, which is not the focus of this study, Lemma 2 derives the parameter condition under which (28) is always positive, which is su¢cient to ensure that the stationary equilibrium is unique. Let's de…ne a parameter threshold q [1 0:5s
Proof. See the Appendix A. Figure 1 plots (25) and (26) in the (h q ; h n ) space. The resource constraint (RC) is negatively sloped while the arbitrage condition (AC) is positively sloped given the parameter condition in Lemma 2. Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, it must be unique. Also, a larger s increases the market value of a new variety and decreases that of a quality improvement; consequently, horizontal R&D h n rises and vertical R&D h q falls. Given this intuitive result (summarized in Proposition 1), the next section uses the growth-theoretic framework to analyze the e¤ects of the pro…t-division rule on economic growth and social welfare.
Proposition 1 Given q < q , there exists a unique equilibrium (h q ; h n ). The equilibrium h n (s) is increasing in s while h q (s) is decreasing in s.
Proof. At h q = 0, h n = 0 in (25) and h n = 1 in (26) . As h q approaches in…nity, h n in (26) approaches zero. Therefore, (25) and (26) must cross exactly once given Lemma 2. An increase in s shifts up (25) in the (h q ; h n ) space leading to an increase in h n and a decrease in h q . See Figure 1 .
E¤ects on growth and welfare
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of pro…t division between sequential innovators on economic growth and social welfare. We …rstly derive the growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule and then the welfare-maximizing rule. Finally, we compare them and characterize the condition under which one is above the other.
The growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule
To derive the balanced growth rate of the consumption index, we substitute (7) into (2) to obtain
The second equality of (29) is obtained by (i) applying symmetry l(i) = l from (10), (ii) normalizing q 0 (i) = 0 for all i, and (iii) using the law of large numbers that implies
. 25 Di¤erentiating (29) with respect to time yields the balanced growth rate of the consumption index given by
where the steady-state number of varieties is n = ' n (h n ) n = and the arrival rate of productivity improvement in each industry is = ' q (h q ) q . To see why the equilibrium growth rate depends on the number of varieties, let's consider the symmetric case of (2) given by ln c t = n ln y t (i). Di¤erentiating ln c t with respect to time yields g = n :
y t (i)=y t (i). In other words, for a given quality growth rate of each variety, increasing the number of varieties causes the aggregate consumption index to grow at a higher rate.
Given that increasing s has a positive e¤ect on n and a negative e¤ect on , there is generally a growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule. Di¤erentiating the log of (30) with respect to s yields
where @h n =@s > 0 and @h q =@s < 0 from Proposition 1. From (27) , we can derive
Substituting (32) into (31) yields
Therefore,
In order to have a better understanding of (34), we can maximize (30) by directly choosing h n and h q subject to (26) . Substituting = ' q (h q ) q and h q = (1 h n )=n into (30) yields g = (n ) 1 q (1 h n ) q ' q ln z, where n = ' n (h n ) n = from (21) . It is easy to show that the growth-maximizing h n is given by , which is increasing in n and decreasing in q . In other words, as horizontal R&D exhibits a less severe degree of decreasing returns to scale (i.e., a larger n ) or as vertical R&D exhibits a more severe degree of decreasing returns to scale (i.e., a smaller q ), the economy should allocate more research labor to horizontal R&D for the purpose of growth maximization. Therefore, the growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule s g arg max g(s) is characterized by moving the equilibrium h n (s g ) to as close to as possible.
Proposition 2 If an interior growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule s g exists, it is implicitly de…ned by
varieties, horizontal innovation would still have an e¤ect on long-run growth if the longrun variety growth rate is endogenous. However, it is common for studies on R&D-based growth models with vertical and horizontal innovation to assume a setup in which the long-run variety growth rate is equal to the exogenous population growth rate for the purpose of eliminating scale e¤ects.
Proof. Note (33) and (34) . Also, recall that h n (s) is increasing in s.
The welfare-maximizing pro…t-division rule
To derive the steady-state welfare, 27 we normalize the time index such that time 0 is the instant when the economy reaches the stationary equilibrium. In this case, (1) becomes
where l = L=n is decreasing in s. In other words, social welfare is determined by the growth rate g as well as the initial level of consumption ln c 0 . Because of this additional level e¤ect, the welfare-maximizing pro…t-division rule is generally di¤erent from the growth-maximizing rule. When s increases, it creates a positive e¤ect as well as a negative e¤ect on ln c 0 = n ln l. By increasing h n and hence n , a larger s increases the number of varieties available for consumption on one hand and decreases the output per variety on the other. Di¤erentiating ln c 0 with respect to s yields
where n = ' n (h n ) n = so that @n =@s > 0. Therefore,
where e = exp (1) . In other words, the level of h n that maximizes initial consumption is given by : (22) shows that for a given (h n ) n , a larger L=' n increases l, so that h n can be larger while initial consumption still rises.
Di¤erentiating (35) with respect to s yields
Denote the welfare-maximizing pro…t-division rule by s u arg max U (s). In Proposition 3, we show that
Intuitively, the welfare-maximizing h n balances between the growth e¤ect and the initial-level e¤ect on welfare. Therefore, it is a weighted average of and . If , then the welfare-maximizing h n is above the growthmaximizing h n , and vice versa. Given that h n (s) is increasing in s, would also imply s u s g .
Proposition 3
The welfare-maximizing pro…t-division rule s u is below (above) the growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule s g if is smaller (larger) than .
Proof. From (34), we know that @g=@s = 0 at h n (s) = . From (37), we know that @ ln c 0 =@s = 0 at h n (s) = . Suppose = . Then, (38) shows that s u = s g . If ( ) , then s u ( )s g because h n (s) is increasing in s.
Finally, we discuss how the supply of unskilled labor L a¤ects the welfaremaximizing pro…t-division rule. From (25) and (26), we see that neither the arbitrage condition nor the resource constraint depend on L. Therefore, the supply of unskilled labor has no e¤ect on the growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule. Furthermore, given that is increasing in L, it must be the case that s u is increasing in L. Intuitively, a larger supply of unskilled labor increases output per variety and hence magni…es the positive e¤ect of n on the initial level of consumption ln c 0 = n ln L n ln n through the term n ln L. Given that the welfare-maximizing s u is increasing in L while the growth-maximizing s g is independent of L, we have the following result illustrated in Figure 2 . Let's …rstly de…ne a threshold value of L given by L ' n n e= .
Proof. This is an implication of Proposition 3 because L L ' n n e= is equivalent to .
Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to illustrate quantitatively the growth and welfare e¤ects of the pro…t-division rule. We …rstly evaluate the e¤ects of increasing s from 0 to 1 on steady-state welfare. Then, we simulate the transition dynamics to compute the complete welfare changes. Speci…cally, we consider two types of policy reform (i) an immediate increase in s and (ii) a gradual increase in s.
Steady-state welfare
For the structural parameters, we either consider conventional parameter values or calibrate their values by using empirical moments in the US before the patent-policy reform in 1982. For the discount rate , we set it to 0.03. For the R&D externality parameters q and n , we consider the symmetric case of = q = n and follow Jones and Williams (2000) to consider a value of = 0:5. 29 Similarly, we consider the symmetric case of ' = ' q = ' n for R&D productivity as in Gersbach et al. (2009) . 30 To calibrate the values of the remaining structural parameters ', , z and L, we use the following four empirical moments (i) the arrival rate of vertical innovation, (ii) the average growth rate of total factor productivity, (iii) R&D as a share of GDP, and (iv) the ratio of R&D scientists and engineers to labor force. For (i), we follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2008) to consider an innovation-arrival rate of = 0:33. For (ii), we consider a value of g = 1:5%. For (iii), we use a value of R&D=GDP = w h =(w h + w l L + n ) = 1:5%. For (iv), there were 711.8 thousands full-time equivalent R&D scientists and engineers in the US in 1982, 31 and there were 110.2 millions people in the US labor force in 1982. Given these empirical moments, we have the following calibrated values f'; ; z; Lg = f0:64; 0:12; 1:02; 153:8g. Table 1 shows that an increase in s would sti ‡e vertical innovation by decreasing the arrival rate of productivity improvements. Despite the increase in horizontal innovation, the overall growth rate eventually decreases. This …nding is consistent with the recent concerns about patent protection sti ‡ing the innovation process. However, Table 1 also suggests an interesting possibility that despite the lower growth rate, steady-state welfare U in (35) increases due to the higher rate of horizontal innovation. 32 ' 33 This illustrative exercise suggests the importance of taking into consideration the stimulating e¤ect of s on horizontal innovation for a proper welfare analysis. 31 This data is obtained from National Science Foundation. See the number of full-time equivalent R&D scientists and engineers in the US. 32 It is useful to note that this …nding of a welfare gain is robust to the normalization of q 0 (i) = 0 for all i. In the case of q 0 (i) = q > 0 for all i, the welfare gain would have been more substantial because q > 0 has the same e¤ect as a larger L as discussed before. 33 We have also considered a hypothetical value of s = 1:1 and …nd that welfare continues to increase in s. This result also applies to the subsequent results with transition dynamics. However, a potential problem with s > 1 is that if patent infringment occurs only when an entrant launches her product in the market (rather than when she comes up with the innovation), she may not have the incentives to launch her high-quality product to avoid paying the penality to the incumbent. If every subsequent entrant acts in this way, then vertical innovation would come to a halt. 22 
Immediate patent reform
In the previous section, we evaluated the e¤ects of an increase in s on steadystate welfare. However, such an analysis neglects the welfare changes during the transition path. Therefore, in this section, we simulate the transition dynamics of the model. 34 Given the transition path of the consumption index, we can then evaluate the complete welfare e¤ects of an immediate increase in s from s = 0 to s 2 f0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8; 1:0g. Comparing Tables  1 and 2 , we see that increasing s would improve welfare even taking into consideration transition dynamics. However, the magnitude of the welfare improvement is smaller than in the case of steady-state welfare. 
Gradual patent reform
In the previous section, we evaluated the welfare e¤ects of an immediate increase in s. However, in the US, the patent reform may be more accurately described as a gradual reform. For example, in 1982, the US Congress established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) as a centralized appellate court for patent cases. "Over the next decade, in case after case, the court signi…cantly broadened and strengthened the rights of patent holders." 35 Furthermore, the Ginarte-Park index (described in Section 1) shows that the strength of patent protection in the US gradually increases from 3.8 in 1975 to 4.9 in 1995. 36 
where the parameter 2 (0; 1) determines the speed of the patent reform.
In the numerical exercise, we consider = 0:05 for illustrative purposes. Table 4 shows that a gradual increase in s would improve social welfare but by a smaller magnitude than an immediate increase in s. Furthermore, the welfare gain is increasing in (i.e., increasing in the speed of reform). As approaches one, the welfare gain becomes the same as in Section 5.2. 
Conclusion
This study develops a simple growth model to shed some light on an often debated question that is whether patent protection stimulates or sti ‡es innovation. We show that both sides of the argument are valid. Speci…cally, protecting incumbents at the expense of entrants would stimulate horizontal innovation but sti ‡e vertical innovation, and the opposite occurs when entrants are protected against incumbents. Although the distinction between vertical and horizontal innovation is blurred in reality, our point is still valid in the sense that patent protection has asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent types of innovation that have di¤erent chances of patent infringement, and hence, the traditional tradeo¤ of optimal patent protection needs to be modi…ed to take into account this asymmetric e¤ect of patent policy. In other words, the optimal patent policy should be innovation-speci…c. If vertical (horizontal) innovation is crucial to social welfare, then a more frontloading (backloading) pro…t-division rule should be implemented. Furthermore, if we follow Aghion and Howitt (1996) to treat horizontal R&D as basic research and vertical R&D as applied research, then our …nding implies that a gradual increase in the bargaining power of the basic researchers could be welfare-improving, and this …nding is consistent with the two-stage R&D analysis in Cozzi and Galli (2009) , who consider a transition to more upstream bargaining power.
Finally, in this study, we have considered a stylized growth model for analytical tractability, and the numerical exercises are for illustrative purposes. Therefore, it would be interesting for future studies to develop a more general dynamic general-equilibrium model to obtain more precise quantitative implications of strengthening patent protection.
In order to calculate the complete change in welfare, we need to keep track of the evolution of the consumption index. 
Normalizing q 0 (i) = 0 for all i, we can re-express the level of aggregate technology as
The …rst term on the right hand side of (B13) is the accumulated number of productivity improvements that have occurred from time 0 to time t. The second term on the right hand side of (B13) is the change in aggregate technology due to the introduction of new varieties net of obsolescence. Using the data generated by Dynare, we could then compute the discretized version of the welfare integral, which allowed the welfare experiments reported in the tables of Section 5. Notice that by normalizing q 0 (i) = 0 for all i, in light of (B13), we are minimizing the e¤ect of : n t on welfare. This proves the robustness of the welfare comparisons in Tables 2 and 4. Given that n t increases from the initial steady state to the new steady state in our numerical exercises, any alternative positive level of the q 0 (i)'s would imply a higher transitional welfare e¤ect of an increase in s. 
